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I. Introduction 
Specialists in infectious disease are protesting a gigantic 
overnight increase in the price of a 62-year-old drug that is the 
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standard of care for treating a life-threatening parasitic 
infection.  
The drug, called Daraprim, was acquired in August 2015 by 
Turing Pharmaceuticals, a start-up run by a former hedge 
fund manager [named Martin Shkreli]. Turing immediately 
raised the price to $750 a tablet from $13.50, bringing the 
annual cost of treatment for some patients to hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.1 
The public was outraged.2 Congressional hearings were held.3 
Shkreli was arrested for fraud in an unrelated matter, and he 
was forced to resign from Turing.4 He promised to lower the price 
of Daraprim, a promise that he largely did not keep.5 More 
                                                                                                     
 1. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-
huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html (last visited Mar. 
30, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Emma 
Court, Here’s Why Daraprim Still Costs $750 a Pill, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 4, 
2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-why-daraprim-
still-costs-750-a-pill-2016-02-03 (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (discussing the 
Daraprim price increase) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Heather Long, Here’s What Happened to AIDS Drug That Spiked 5,000%, CNN 
MONEY (Aug. 25, 2016, 12:10 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/25/news/economy/daraprim-aids-drug-high-price/ 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Victor Luckerson, Everything to Know About the Arrested Drug Price-
Hiking CEO, TIME (Dec. 17, 2015), http://time.com/4153512/martin-shkreli-
pharmaceuticals-arrested-turing-daraprim/ (last updated Dec. 18, 2015, 12:48 
PM) (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Lydia Ramsey, There’s Now A $1-A-Pill Competitor To Pharma 
CEO Martin Shkreli’s $750-A-Pill Drug, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2015, 4:27 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/a-compound-pharma-company-is-making-
a-daraprim-killer-2015-10 (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (same) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See Long, supra note 1 (discussing public response to the Daraprim 
price increase). 
 3. See Court, supra note 1 (noting hearings held before the House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform). 
 4. See Luckerson, supra note 1 (“[T]he 32-year-old entrepreneur [Shkreli] 
has been arrested for securities fraud in a case tied to a separate pharma 
company that he used to run . . . . Shkreli has resigned as CEO of Turing 
Pharmaceuticals.”). 
 5. See Court, supra note 1 (discussing Turing’s promise to lower 
Daraprim’s price). 
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recently, while there has been some decline, at last report 
Daraprim apparently still costs significantly more than it did 
before the initial price increase.6 Meanwhile, other companies 
have promised to bring the drug to market far more cheaply.7 
Wells Fargo has also recently elicited significant outrage.8 
Bank employees were caught having opened millions of “ghost” 
bank and credit card accounts for existing customers, responding 
to pressure to sell each customer or household eight banking 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Long, supra note 1 (noting that (as of the date of the article) 
Daraprim’s price was still approximately $375 per pill). 
 7. See Ramsey, supra note 1 (discussing compounding pharmacies that 
are offering dramatically cheaper alternatives). 
 8. See Geoff Colvin, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf’s $41 Million 
‘Clawback’ Isn’t What It Appears, FORTUNE (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/10/03/john-stumpf-wells-fargo-clawback/ (last updated 
Oct. 3, 2016, 4:30 PM) (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (“Wells Fargo and CEO John 
Stumpf are getting beaten up like no other bank or CEO since the financial 
crisis.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Stacy Cowley, ‘Lions 
Hunting Zebras’: Ex-Wells Fargo Bankers Describe Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/business/dealbook/lions-hunting-
zebras-ex-wells-fargo-bankers-describe-abuses.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) 
[hereinafter Cowley, Lions Hunting Zebras] (“Wells Fargo would like to close the 
chapter on the sham account scandal, saying it has changed its policies, 
replaced its chief executive and refunded $2.6 million to customers. But 
lawmakers and regulators say they will not let it go that quickly.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo to Claw Back 
$41 Million of Chief’s Pay Over Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-john-stumpf-
compensation.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (“As more details emerge of how 
toxic Wells Fargo’s sales culture could be—and of how many workers were fired 
or punished for their attempts to draw attention to the problems they saw at 
their branches—the scandal has intensified.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Matt Egan, I Called the Wells Fargo Ethics Line and Was 
Fired, CNN MONEY (Sept. 21, 2016, 1:26 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/21/investing/wells-fargo-fired-workers-retaliation-
fake-accounts/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (describing claims that Wells Fargo 
made a practice of firing employees who reported ethical violations) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Matt Levine, Wells Fargo Opened a 
Couple Million Fake Accounts, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Sept. 9, 2016, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-09-09/wells-fargo-opened-a-
couple-million-fake-accounts (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (describing problematic 
practices supposedly used by Wells Fargo to generate new accounts from 
existing customers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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products; the mantra was “Eight is Great.”9 Employees say that 
they feared for their jobs if they did not sell the required number 
of accounts, so, with their supervisors’ acquiescence, they created 
accounts without the customers’ consent.10 There are allegations 
that college students, Native Americans depositing their portion 
of casino earnings distributed to tribe members, Mexicans 
without social security numbers, and the elderly were 
particularly targeted for the unauthorized accounts, presumably 
on grounds that they were less likely to ask questions.11 There 
are also allegations that individuals anonymously reporting the 
accounts on the ethics hotline were tracked down and fired.12 The 
bank was fined $185 million, 5,300 employees were fired, the 
CEO resigned, and he and another top executive responsible for 
the business unit involved, who had recently retired, returned 
millions of dollars of compensation (although the high amounts 
reported in the media may be overstated).13  
What Turing did was not illegal.14 What Wells Fargo did was 
illegal, but the behavior nevertheless persisted for quite a long 
time, perhaps close to ten years, or even longer.15  
                                                                                                     
 9. See Levine, supra note 8 (describing Wells Fargo practices encouraging 
the opening of unauthorized accounts); Doreen McCallister, Wells Fargo CEO 
Discusses Secret-Accounts Scandal in Senate Hearing, NPR (Sep. 20, 2016, 5:26 
AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/20/494680201/wells-fargo-
ceo-to-address-accounts-scandal-before-senate-panel (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) 
(“When it comes to cross-selling, Wells Fargo used the slogan ‘Eight is Great.’”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 10. See McCallister, supra note 9 (“Managers often tell employees to do 
whatever it takes to reach their quotas. Employees who do not reach their 
quotas are often required to work hours beyond their typical work schedule 
without being compensated for that extra work time, and/or are threatened with 
termination.”). 
 11. See Cowley, Lions Hunting Zebras, supra note 8 (“They would look for 
the weakest, the ones that would put up the least resistance.”). 
 12. See Egan, supra note 8 (discussing claims of retaliation against 
whistleblowers). 
 13. See id. (discussing the fallout of the Wells Fargo scandal). 
 14. See Long, supra note 1 (“It’s not illegal what they’ve done [at Turing], 
but it’s unethical and immoral.” (quoting Dr. Judith Aberg)). 
 15. See Egan, supra note 8 (discussing claims that the practice of opening 
unauthorized accounts was of long standing). 
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Four more examples help set the stage. One is casinos’ 
attempts to entice people the casinos know or should suspect 
have gambling problems to visit their casinos. In the extreme, a 
casino might even target people who had previously gone 
bankrupt because of their gambling debts who then obtained 
money by inheritance or otherwise, sending such people vouchers 
or other enticements to visit the casino.16 A second is one 
company’s business model of buying structured settlements—
amounts payable over a period of time, typically several years—
for lead paint exposures from people who had gotten such 
settlements in exchange for a too-small immediate lump sum 
payment,17 conduct for which the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau has sued the company.18 A third is the practice by some 
plaintiffs’ law firms to identify companies that are about to 
merge, advertise for plaintiffs (shareholders of the company) who 
they can represent to make (arguably, quite specious) arguments 
that the merger disclosure was inaccurate, and then push for and 
accept a settlement in which the company adds some small 
disclosures, the officers and directors of the company get an 
expansive release, and the lawyers get a significant payoff for 
their trouble.19 A final example is some medical providers’ (eye 
doctors and dentists, mostly) practice of visiting nursing homes 
                                                                                                     
 16. See John Rosengren, How Casinos Enable Gambling Addicts, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/losing-it-
all/505814/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (describing strategies used by casinos to 
encourage gambling) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 17. See Terrence McCoy, How Companies Make Millions Off 
Lead-Poisoned, Poor Blacks, WASH. POST, (Aug. 25, 2015), (last visited Mar. 30, 
2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/how-companies-make-
millions-off-lead-poisoned-poor-blacks/2015/08/25/7460c1de-0d8c-11e5-9726-
49d6fa26a8c6_story.html?utm_term=.95ebba6c9f87 (last visited May 2, 2017) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 18. CFPB Sues Access Funding for Scamming Lead-Paint Poisoning 
Victims Out of Settlement Money, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Nov. 21, 
2016), [hereinafter CFPB Sues Access Funding] 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-access-funding-
scamming-lead-paint-poisoning-victims-out-settlement-money/ (last visited May 
2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 19. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, 
Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical 
Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015); Sean J. Griffith, 
Correcting Corporate Benefit, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
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and getting incompetent patients’ relatives to approve ambitious 
treatment plans for unnecessary medical care that would be 
largely or exclusively paid for with government funds.20  
All these examples are of business practices that, it seems 
fair to say, elicit strong negative reactions. In some cases, the 
practices are illegal but in many cases, they are in a grey area, or 
are even legal—albeit quite undesirable from a societal 
perspective. I wondered whether additional forces could be 
marshaled against these types of practices, preferably before they 
were able to cause much harm. This Essay provides my starting 
suggestion as to how to proceed; I will develop the ideas in detail 
in a longer piece. The hope is to develop and define a concept—
“Repugnant Business Models”—and try to make it salient, such 
that it could be used to pressure companies to represent that they 
were not using such models (or were using their best efforts not 
to use such models), and to explain the steps they were taking to 
assure that result. Critically, the pressure would not be to a 
binary end, just as Repugnant Business Models is not a binary 
concept. Turing’s price increase might make a lesser, but still 
high, price increase less outrage-inducing.21 Companies should be 
pressured to examine whether they are using a business model or 
engaging in practices intended to “take advantage” (of patients 
needing life-saving drugs, of gambling addicts, of 
doctor-venerating relatives of incompetent patients, etc.). 
                                                                                                     
 20.  See Peter Eisler & Barbara Hansen, Doctors Perform Thousands of 
Unnecessary Surgeries, USA TODAY (June 19, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/18/unnecessary-surgery-
usa-today-investigation/2435009/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (describing 
unnecessary surgeries performed by doctors) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Katie Lobosco, Doctors and Nurses Busted for $712 Million 
Medicare Fraud, CNN MONEY (Jun. 21, 2015, 2:50 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/19/pf/medicare-fraud-doctors/ (last visited Mar. 
30, 2017) (discussing fraudulent practices targeting vulnerable populations) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Note that much of what is 
written is about practices that are illegal but enforcement is difficult. The 
practice described in the text—which I personally encountered—certainly 
violates the spirit of the law, but does not violate the letter of the law. 
 21.  I thank Peter Krause for pointing out that a visceral example of 
repugnance might inspire other companies to take advantage of the high bar 
thus set to seem less repugnant by comparison.  
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The pressure might, for public companies, take the form of 
shareholder proposals or SEC disclosure requirements. Perhaps 
shareholders or state attorneys general could be allowed to bring 
lawsuits against companies for employing Repugnant Business 
Models? Lawmakers and policymakers might also feel pressured 
to act—to close loopholes (which is arguably what was at issue 
with Daraprim), counter influential interest groups (at issue in 
other repugnant pharmaceutical industry practices), or beef up 
enforcement (which could have uncovered the Wells Fargo 
situation sooner, perhaps by looking expressly for too-aggressive 
and unrealistic sales targets), for instance. In appropriate cases, 
judges could, in dicta, encourage (or regulators, in deferred 
prosecution agreements or nonprosecution agreements, could 
require) companies to take steps to ensure they were not using 
Repugnant Business Models. Courts or lawmakers might broaden 
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to allow recourse to 
shareholders’ personal assets where their corporation’s business 
model effectively took advantage of the corporate form, using the 
corporation to externalize harms from Repugnant Business 
Models and “organized [and maintained] with capital insufficient 
to meet liabilities which are certain to arise in the ordinary 
course of the corporation’s business.”22 
The Repugnant Business Model concept is intended to have 
both reputational and legal force. Most companies care about 
their reputations, and shaming might cause them to examine 
their practices. Those that do not, such as companies whose 
entire business model is premised on such models, would 
presumably care about potentially increased costs and sanctions 
from lawmakers and courts.  
This Essay and the broader project have another and 
perhaps seemingly contradictory aim: to suggest that outrage 
against some other business models is in fact misplaced. I will 
argue, for instance, that Uber’s surge pricing during popular 
times unwarrantedly elicits outrage. This outrage led to legal 
restrictions in some jurisdictions.23 
                                                                                                     
 22.  Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 427 (N.Y. 1966). I thank 
Randall Thomas for this suggestion.  
 23. See Danielle Muoio, Uber’s Surge Pricing Was Just Banned in the 
World’s Second-Largest City, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2016, 11:57 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-can-no-longer-offer-surge-pricing-in-delhi-
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This aim is, though, less contradictory than it might appear. 
If everything induces outrage, outrage loses its force. I argue here 
that there can be a principled articulation of the conditions under 
which outrage is, and is not, warranted. Such an articulation 
should make outrage a more effective force for advancing society’s 
interests. 
In all, I will distinguish between three types of business 
models: Repugnant Business Models generally elicit, and 
warrant, pure outrage. Another category involves models which 
elicit some outrage, but the outrage reflects a societal clash in 
values. One common clash is between paternalism and autonomy. 
Another involves the extent to which disadvantaged people 
should be able to get health care, housing, food, or other 
“necessities” at societal expense, and more generally, what 
disparities in access to “necessities” is appropriate and what the 
“haves” owe to the greater society.  
To illustrate the paternalism vs. autonomy clash, consider 
potentially differing reactions to the physical features of many 
casinos. The casinos seek to disorient patrons by having no 
windows, carpets with elaborate patterns, and very few clocks. 
People are, one could say, being tricked into spending more time 
in casinos and presumably, gambling more. But aren’t people 
responsible for resisting such lures? Clashes implicating differing 
views about the consequences of inequality and the 
responsibilities of good citizens are so obvious and frequent as to 
scarcely need illustrations, but one interesting example warrants 
mention: outrage over surge pricing for transportation when the 
increased demand causing the surge relates to a natural disaster 
(or an “unnatural” disaster such as terrorism). Should Uber, as a 
                                                                                                     
2016-4 (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (noting New Delhi banned Uber’s surge 
pricing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Will 
Brunelle & Dana Rubinstein, Bill Would Ban ‘Surge Pricing’ by Uber, Rideshare 
Services, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2015, 5:34 AM), http://www.politico.com/states/new-
york/albany/story/2015/02/bill-would-ban-surge-pricing-by-uber-rideshare-serv 
ices-086949 (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (discussing efforts to ban surge pricing 
in New York) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Liam Dillon, 
California Bill Seeking to Limit Surge Pricing by Uber and Lyft Dies, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 29, 2016, 7:12 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-essential-
poli-uber-and-lyft-surge-pricing-bill-dies-1461112198-htmlstory.html (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2017) (detailing failed efforts to ban surge pricing in California) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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matter of good civic citizenship, pay drivers a premium that is not 
passed along to passengers if those passengers are fleeing a 
hurricane?  
My third category is models that, in my view, elicit 
unwarranted outrage, such as surge pricing during popular 
times. There is much more to be said about these examples and 
categories, of course. In this Essay, I can only sketch out some of 
the principal delineations and arguments.  
Ultimately, what motivates this Essay (and the larger project 
that will further develop the ideas) is my view that attempts to 
influence corporate behavior, including those made by 
lawmakers, but to a greater extent through extra-legal means, 
are too often based on fads and people’s “agendas,” rather than 
from a principled consideration of what corporations should and 
should not be doing. Better-focused pressure can and should be 
brought to bear on corporate actors as well as government actors. 
In many cases, I would argue for more pressure. In other cases, I 
would argue for less. And in some cases, where the issues may be 
intractable, the society would benefit from a reasoned discussion 
that acknowledges differences in first principles leading to 
resolutions that many find outrageous, but that are quite 
acceptable to others. 
II. Defining Repugnant Business Models 
Consider a “perfect” transaction, one involving a willing, 
informed buyer with full capacity to contract. Even better, the 
seller would be a repeat player or otherwise have a considerable 
reputational stake in the transaction. Many transactions do not 
meet that ideal, but some are, of course, far further from it than 
others. Repugnant Business Models are those that are designed 
to take advantage—either of people under duress, people who are 
particularly vulnerable (and to which the society may be 
solicitous), third parties, or some combination thereof, or of a 
legal privilege, for a reason that violates the spirit of the law. The 
word “designed” in this formulation means that the 
advantage-taking is intended.24 A model for this purpose can be a 
                                                                                                     
 24. I owe this observation to Francis Shen.  
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company’s principal business—its ‘raison d’être’—or it can simply 
be one business or practice of many. 
The determination is also not binary. There are degrees of 
taking advantage, and there are degrees of intention. A person 
who needs a lifesaving drug urgently when no alternatives exist 
is arguably more amenable to being taken advantage of than a 
person who became bankrupt because of gambling losses and now 
is being tempted with free gambling chips to visit a casino. (Or, 
perhaps, the two are equally amenable to being taken advantage 
of, but society should be more solicitous of the person needing the 
drug?) A CEO who knows perfectly well that her “lifesaving” drug 
is worthless has more of an intention to take advantage than one 
who simply has anecdotal evidence that the drug might work, but 
has not had testing done that might support, or disprove, the 
drug’s efficacy. Taken to its extreme, the application of this 
concept could be truly ludicrous, extending to practices that, in 
my view, absolutely should not be considered repugnant: a 
company spends a lot of money making a wonderful product, the 
(high) price of which reflects its development costs, and it 
becomes a “must have” product for everyone, including people 
who then “have” to “sacrifice” necessities to obtain it. The iPhone 
may be an example. I discuss later in this Essay how to 
characterize outrage in this context: as reflecting a clash in 
values among people in the society as to what a baseline standard 
of living should consist of, and how much higher a standard of 
living money should be able to buy. 
My project requires very difficult, and contestable, 
distinctions. It is important (albeit quite difficult) to distinguish 
between raising the price of a lifesaving generic drug one has 
acquired the rights to sell, and recouping the price of a lifesaving 
drug one has recently and at great expense developed. In the first 
case, the model in this formulation consists of the acquisition of 
the generic drug with the intent of significantly raising its price; 
in the second case, the model is both the development and sale of 
the drug. The consumers in both cases are just as desperate (and 
hence “under duress”). But many would agree with the 
characterization that the former is an abuse of the law, while the 
latter is the law’s intended and desired goal. The latter is not 
“taking advantage” while the former arguably is. 
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The Repugnant Business Model concept will require a 
systematic definition. Among the likely sources are contract law 
and other forms of consumer protection law. In both types of law, 
contracts can in some circumstances be found unenforceable. 
Contract law, for instance, provides that contracts entered into or 
modified under duress, contracts made with parties who are 
incompetent, contracts that are unconscionable (meaning, 
generally, that the terms are extremely unfavorable to one party, 
typically a type of party to which the law is solicitous), contracts 
where a party is exerting undue influence or attempting to 
impose an “unfair” term on the other party, may be 
unenforceable.25 Most of the examples in this Essay involve 
something in the general family of duress, incompetence, or 
undue influence, but there are examples tracking these other 
doctrines as well. 
That being said, the concept of Repugnant Business Models 
needs to also encompass certain third party harms, such as the 
government paying for unnecessary health care. Law does not 
have an express category or particular label for third party 
harms, but such harms are a familiar focus of law. Tax is a 
particularly frequent context: the obvious third party is the 
government, which is losing out on revenue to which it is 
arguably entitled, due to actions by a person and her tax adviser. 
When the government allocates money to pay for health care for 
senior citizens, the money is supposed to go towards improving 
the life of such citizens, not lining the pockets of providers who 
have finagled their way into providing unnecessary services. 
When the law contemplates a settlement between lawyers 
purportedly representing the two sides in a dispute, neither side 
is supposed to be in a position to advance its own interests while 
harming the interests of its supposed client.  
Let us apply this rough definition of intentionally taking 
advantage to the examples above. The first example involved 
                                                                                                     
 25. See, e.g., CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, 
PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 533–667 (7th ed., 2012) (discussing principles in 
contract law under which enforcement of a contract can be denied, such as 
incapacity, bargaining misconduct, unconscionability, and public policy). There 
is also precedent, such as “anti-abuse” rules and regulations in various contexts, 
for the form of a transaction not to be respected, a subject that will be more fully 
developed in the detailed exposition of these ideas. 
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Daraprim. The problem is not just the high price—after all, as 
noted above, a critical point of the patent system is to motivate 
innovation by allowing the innovator to be handsomely 
rewarded.26 Many new drugs cost a great deal, which may be 
controversial when the price is particularly high, but, at least 
until recently, often has not been.27 The problem is that the 
innovation at issue in the Daraprim case was in the distant past, 
Daraprim was no longer under patent, and Turing was exploiting 
a regulatory “glitch”—even generic drugs require a form of FDA 
approval, which Daraprim already had, but other potential 
manufacturers did not.28 Because the approval is time consuming, 
at the lower price, other manufacturers had not found the 
approval worthwhile to obtain.29 The other companies now 
promising to bring the drug to market more cheaply were 
“compounding” pharmacies, which are allowed to make drugs 
using pre-approved compounds, for specialized uses.30  
                                                                                                     
 26. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003) (“There is virtually unanimous agreement that the 
purpose of the patent system is to promote innovation by granting exclusive 
rights to encourage invention.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Carolyn Y. Johnson, $300,000 a year? Doctors Question High 
Drug Prices for Rare Diseases, BOSTON GLOBE MEDIA PARTNERS (Oct. 1, 2013, 
6:03 PM), http://archive.boston.com/news/science/blogs/science-in-
mind/2013/10/01/year-doctors-question-high-drug-prices-for-rare-
diseases/rJwjMUXTyTFWkkDt lj5dxJ/blog.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) 
(noting the high cost of many new drugs) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 28. See John Graham, Martin Shkreli a Creature of FDA Regulation, Not 
Pharma Industry’s Greed, FORBES (Sep. 28, 2015, 5:17 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2015/09/28/martin-shkreli-is-a-
creature-of-fda-regulation-not-pharma-industrys-greed (last visited Mar. 30, 
2017) (discussing the price impact of the FDA approval process for generic 
drugs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29. See id. (noting the lack of other generic alternatives). 
 30. See Ramsey, supra note 1 (discussing the use of compounding 
pharmacies). Another very similar example involves the EpiPen, a device for 
delivering epinephrine to someone in the throes of an allergic attack. See 
generally Gretchen Morgenson, EpiPen Price Rises Could Mean More Riches for 
Mylan Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/09/04/business/at-mylan-lets-pretend-is-more-than-a-game.html (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2017) (describing price increase of EpiPen) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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The pharmaceutical industry offers many other examples. A 
notorious practice in the industry involves a product about to lose 
patent protection that is slightly tweaked so that it can be 
re-patented and gain exclusivity for several more years.31 Yet 
another practice, now illegal, is for a patent holder of an expiring 
patent to pay a potential generic manufacturer to delay producing 
the product so that the patent holder can retain exclusivity 
beyond the patent period.32 These examples are also of “taking 
advantage,” here of a system intended to motivate innovation, but 
instead being used to get higher prices. And we can consider who 
is being taken advantage of in such cases—the consumer, the 
government, the private insurer, etc. The unnecessary health 
care example takes advantage of a third party—the 
government—which is paying for the health care in question. I 
would argue that it takes advantage of the patients as well, 
especially insofar as the health care may be painful and even 
dangerous. A safeguard against the provision of the unnecessary 
care exists under law: approval must be obtained from 
“competent” individuals authorized to consent on behalf of the 
party lacking capacity. But, in my view, the safeguard does not 
suffice. The individuals will not infrequently be cowed by medical 
personnel, agreeing to what has been “recommended.” I would 
wager a considerable amount that the dentists proposing 
extensive painful dental work for patients who are not in pain 
and who are in the last years of their lives would not recommend 
such work for their own close relatives. Intuition strongly argues 
that the model is a paradigmatic example of the category: a 
business model that is designed to take advantage, and that 
would not make sense but for taking advantage.  
                                                                                                     
 31. See TOM COTTER, PATENT WARS: HOW PATENT DISPUTES IMPACT OUR 
DAILY LIVES (forthcoming 2017) (discussing patenting minor improvements on 
drugs to extend patent protection). 
 32. See Marc-André Gagnon, Corruption of Pharmaceutical Markets: 
Addressing the Misalignment of Financial Incentives and Public Health, 41 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 571 (2013) (discussing problems posed by combining profit 
driven private industry and public health needs); Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michelle 
M. Mello & David M. Studdert, Strategies and Practices in Off-Label Marketing 
of Pharmaceuticals: A Retrospective Analysis of Whistleblower Complaints, 8 
PLOS MED. e1000431 (2011) (discussing off-label marketing of pharmaceuticals); 
see also generally TOM COTTER, supra note 31 (providing background about 
tactics used to delay ANDA applications and antitrust implications). 
986 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973 (2017) 
The structured settlement purchases involve a very similar 
mechanism. They must by law be approved by someone 
“independent,” but the law has not proven effective in ensuring 
that nominal independence is true independence. The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau has charged that “Access Funding [a 
company in the business of buying these settlements] steered 
victims to receive ‘independent advice’ from a sham advisor, an 
attorney who was actually paid directly by the company and 
indicated to consumers that the transactions required little 
scrutiny.”33 
The casino example is similar in important respects. Yes, the 
person receiving inducements to gamble has not been declared 
incompetent, but the person is known to be someone with a 
gambling addiction and who has lost considerable amounts of 
money that he almost certainly could not afford to lose. Sending a 
letter with free gambling chips and other inducements to gamble 
to someone who went bankrupt on account of gambling debts is 
surely an attempt to take advantage of a well-known 
vulnerability. As I discuss below, trying to make such conduct 
illegal risks overreaching and encountering vehement objections 
on grounds of paternalism—which is precisely why an approach 
based on extra-legal pressure might be indicated. 
Let us consider two other examples involving what Richard 
Painter and I have called financial maneuvering, which is an 
attempt to do an end-run around financial regulations or 
covenants.34 One is Enron’s attempt, using various 
investment-bank crafted techniques, to vastly understate the 
amount of debt it had.35 The other is Goldman Sachs’ creation of a 
cross-currency swap that enabled Greece to understate its debt so 
as to meet the requirements to adopt the Euro.36 The parties that 
                                                                                                     
 33.  CFPB Sues Access Funding, supra note 18.  
 34. See CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER 
BANKS 66 (2015) (identifying financial maneuvering as a form of financial 
engineering “intended to deceive or subvert a regulatory scheme or contractual 
obligation”). 
 35. See id. at 66 (“Enron used many bank-crafted techniques to create a 
wholly false financial appearance, intending to deceive the market into thinking 
it was far healthier than it was.”). 
 36. See id. (“In Goldman’s cross-currency swap with Greece, there was an 
EU regulation intended to limit Greece’s debt level, which Goldman apparently 
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were hurt in these cases were third parties—indeed, in both 
cases, the two parties to the transaction were getting precisely 
what they bargained for.37 And the legality of what was 
contracted for is complicated—unlike in the case with Wells 
Fargo, where the conduct was clearly illegal but apparently not 
stopped for a long time, this conduct is close to the line for many 
reasons, including, in the case of the Greek cross-currency swap, 
jurisdictional reasons.38 
Where is law in all this? Where should law be in all this? 
These are very difficult and weighty questions that warrant 
further exposition. For present purposes, I make two points. 
First, the conduct at issue in Repugnant Business Models would, 
by most metrics, seem “as bad” as conduct that is illegal, and 
many of the rationales for making conduct illegal would apply to 
Repugnant Business Models. In some cases, what is at issue are 
negative externalities, a well-recognized and accepted reason for 
law. In others, it is some combination of paternalism and 
externalities—the bankrupt gambler and his family now have to 
rely on public assistance. In some cases, it may be a case of fixing 
a problem that law itself created—a loophole, for instance—that 
allows patent protection for far longer than was intended or is 
needed. The law—granting patent protection—intended to 
interfere with markets for a good reason, but it was used to allow 
interference even absent that reason. More broadly, improving 
the workings of markets is seen as a plausible rationale for law, 
and many Repugnant Business Models interfere with markets. 
                                                                                                     
helped Greece to effectively subvert.”). 
 37. See id. at 66–68 (identifying third parties as the primary group 
harmed). 
 38.  Yet another example is private prisons. Governments want to save 
money by privatizing prisons. They would like to assure quality, but doing so is 
quite difficult, especially where the companies’ incentives are deeply perverse: 
they want more prisoners serving longer sentences and want to spend the 
smallest amount of money possible on them. Governments are hard pressed to 
monitor to overcome these incentives. This problem has been recognized for 
quite a long time. See generally Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny, 
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q.J. 
ECON. 1127 (1997) (discussing reasons why certain services should be provided 
by governments, and certain other public services can be contracted out to third 
party providers). Note that it is the prisoners as well as the broader society on 
whom the costs are being foisted. Id. 
988 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973 (2017) 
The examples are those we have seen before: transactions 
involving fraud or duress or undue influence or taking advantage 
of diminished capacity.   
Second, in some cases, it is plausible to say that the conduct 
would be effectively addressed by law but for certain obstacles, 
such as difficulties in specification, difficulties in enforcement, 
and failures of political will. Specification is always a challenge. 
Attempts at greater precision, in the form of rules, provide road 
maps for evasion. But the standard alternative to rules, 
standards, are also problematic, allowing too-expansive use of 
law, and corroding law’s legitimacy. Consider trying to specify 
what sorts of medical care could be recommended for people near 
the end of life. Process-based solutions may be employed, but they 
are amenable to the same problems as are rules: the cowed 
relative approving the unnecessary health care, and the 
“independent” person approving the fairness of the structured 
settlement purchase.  
Enforcement is also difficult, with nimbler and better 
resourced-businesses prevailing over (less nimble and 
under-resourced) regulators (often, in the notorious “whack a 
mole”). Problems of political will arise when it’s clear that the 
status quo does some harm and could be improved upon, but 
powerful interests benefit from the status quo and block any 
changes. The problem of new patents granted on slightly tweaked 
versions of old drugs losing patent protection could easily be 
remedied by a requirement that the new drug do something 
useful that the previous drug did not.39 Among the hoped-for 
strengths of the approach I suggest here is an increase in 
pressure that could counter a lack of political will, and, more 
broadly, pressure that could make the search for loopholes as a 
business model more reputationally costly. One recent salutary 
development, involving a legal solution to the problems posed by 
a particular Repugnant Business Model, is the new judicial 
hostility in Delaware to disclosure-only settlements granting 
defendants, corporate officers and directors, broad releases from 
liability in exchange for some trivial increased disclosure and a 
                                                                                                     
 39. I owe this example to Lisa Larrimore Ouellette.  
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big check to plaintiffs’ lawyers.40 After hearing convincing 
demonstrations that these settlements were pernicious, the 
courts became far less apt to approve them.41 Of course, the result 
might be that, at least in the short term, the litigation somehow 
manages to move to other jurisdictions. Hopefully, the concept of 
Repugnant Business Models can complement those courts’ 
consideration of the issues when they arise.  
III. Other Types of Business Models 
Models that do not fit into my Repugnant Business Models 
category also sometimes elicit outrage. I consider two such 
models. I make no claim to being comprehensive, but I believe 
these models go a significant way to covering the relevant terrain. 
The first model elicits outrage because of an underlying 
conflict in values. The conflict that can be articulated most 
straightforwardly is between paternalism and autonomy. How 
much should the society protect people from themselves, and how 
much are people chargeable with protecting themselves? What 
happens when protecting some people increases costs for those 
not in need of protection? Recall the perfect transaction with 
which the Repugnant Business Models were contrasted—the 
well-informed, fully competent buyer, and perhaps, a seller with a 
significant reputational stake. Many of the transactions in the 
Repugnant category had buyers who were under duress or 
particularly vulnerable.42 In these conflict of values models, the 
buyers’ foibles are far less extreme—the buyers may, for instance, 
be “too easily” tempted. The gambling addict is of course a hard 
                                                                                                     
 40. See generally Matt Chiappardi, Meet the Man Changing Deal Litigation 
As We Know It, LAW360 (Apr. 19, 2016) 
https://www.law360.com/articles/785037/meet-the-man-changing-deal-litigation-
as-we-know-it (last visited May 1, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Edward B. Micheletti, Jeness E. Parker & Bonnie W. David, 
Forward Momentum: Trulia Continues to Impact Resolution of Deal Litigation 
in Delaware and Beyond, SKADDEN (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/forward-momentum-trulia-continues-impact-
resolution-deal-litigation-delaware-and-beyond (last visited May 1, 2017) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) 
 41. Id. 
 42. Infra Part II. 
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case—my fuzzy attempt at demarcation characterizes a direct 
lure to identified addicts being repugnant, while a softer lure that 
is made more broadly is characterized as being in the conflict 
category. Any principled attempt the society made to be more 
solicitous to people on grounds of how tempted they can be (allow 
themselves to be?) would quickly lead to objections of excessive 
paternalism. Many people might want our society to be more 
paternalistic, but many people very much do not. 
One example in this category is the production, sale, and 
marketing of hyper-palatable foods, now that the foods are known 
to mute natural signals of satiation and otherwise contribute to 
significant overeating and unhealthy diets.43 Another is 
marketing expensive “status” sneakers, especially to populations 
without much disposable income.44 Many other examples can be 
given, such as payday loans and other very expensive ways for 
people without much money to acquire money quickly.45 Yet other 
examples include supersizing options for fast food meals, or, as 
discussed earlier, casinos’ use of disorienting carpets to get 
would-be gamblers to lose track of time and place.46 (What about 
the carpet manufacturer making the carpets expressly for casinos 
and knowing their purpose? Their model would probably fit into 
this category as well.) 
One term that covers some of the examples in the 
paternalism versus autonomy category is “bad nudges.” The 
                                                                                                     
 43. See generally MICHAEL MOSS, SALT SUGAR FAT: HOW THE FOOD GIANTS 
HOOKED US (paperback ed. 2014) (discussing techniques used by food 
manufacturers to make food more addictive).  
 44. See Emily Chertoff, The Racial Divide on . . . Sneakers, ATLANTIC (Aug. 
20, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/08/the-racial-
divide-on-sneakers/261256/ (last visited May 1, 2017) (describing the 
prominence of status sneakers in low-income African American communities) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 45. See Megan McArdle, On Poverty, Interest Rates, and Payday Loans, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 18, 2009), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/11/on-poverty-interest-rates-
and-payday-loans/30431/ (last visited May, 2017) (discussing high interest and 
fee financing options targeted toward low-income communities) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 46. See generally NATASHA DOW SCHULL, ADDICTION BY DESIGN (2013) 
(describing techniques used by casinos to get people to gamble more money and 
for longer periods of time).  
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concept of “nudges” was originated by Richard Thaler and Cass 
Sunstein in their seminal 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions 
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. 47 As the title suggests, the 
book focuses on “good nudges”—nudges that encourage behavior 
that society desires and, they argue, individuals “really” desire 
too, such as make healthier food choices.48 For example, fruit, 
rather than candy, might be placed near cash registers at 
supermarkets, encouraging impulse purchases of fruit and 
discouraging impulse purchases of candy. Bad nudges, by 
contrast, are manipulations of buyers by self-interested sellers.49 
An example is a “free” one month trial magazine subscription 
that includes an automatic renewal at the regular price, where 
the procedures to cancel the subscription are buried in fine 
print.50   
Words used to describe the models at issue sometimes are 
quite charged—“exploitation,” for instance—and there is an 
interesting linguistic ambiguity in the word that is not 
accidental. Is a business practice of having casino employees 
looking for gamblers seated at a slot machine who are showing 
                                                                                                     
 47. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). Thaler and Sunstein advocate 
good nudges, “non-coercive” ways of getting people to make better decisions. Id. 
But they have noted that there are bad nudges as well. Id. A paradigmatically 
bad nudge would attempt to covertly manipulate a buyer, for the benefit of the 
seller, giving the buyer little ability to opt out. Id. Admittedly, the word 
“manipulation” is charged, and quite difficult to define rigorously and other than 
conclusorily. But the concept may nevertheless have sufficient traction.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Sunstein and Thaler argued that “nudges” achieved aims that might be 
considered paternalistic while not being paternalistic. Indeed, the concept was 
originally called “libertarian paternalism,” which the authors characterized as 
“anti-anti paternalism.” See generally Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003). Some have argued that 
nudges (good or bad) actually can or do undermine autonomy. See, e.g., 
Christopher McCrudden & Jeff King, The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics, 
Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism, QUEEN’S U. (2015) 
http://pure.qub.ac.uk/ portal/en/publications/the-dark-side-of-nudging(062809e1-
27c2-4ce5-b742-bbc0a 517fb32)/export.html (last visited May 1, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This is not the place to air the 
debate fully, but for present purposes, suffice it to say stark oppositions between 
paternalism and autonomy in principle and in practice may be difficult to 
articulate fully satisfactorily, which has added to the muddle of this category. 
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signs of hunger and bringing the people meals so they will not 
stop gambling exploitative? (And if so, what follows?) How about 
using a technique to determine a person’s preferred resistance 
from the gambling lever, and automatically setting the device to 
that resistance? (Both practices are described in the book 
Addiction by Design,51 as are the disorienting carpets mentioned 
above, lack of windows, and lack of clocks, all to discourage easy 
exit from the casino.) What about the Heart Attack Grill, a 
restaurant in Las Vegas that has “courted controversy by serving 
high-calorie menu items with deliberately provocative names 
coupled with waitresses in sexually provocative clothing?”52 
Complicating matters, people not protected from themselves 
may inflict costs on third parties—people who spend all their 
money gambling may leave their households impoverished, and 
people who eat too much unhealthy food may have higher health 
costs borne by others. To what extent business models which 
allow for or encourage these behaviors should be discouraged, and 
by what means, are important questions—what is critical for my 
purposes is to distinguish the models at issue from repugnant 
business models. One very difficult-to-classify example is the 
attempts by investment banks just before the financial crisis to 
unload their toxic securities onto “sophisticated” money managers 
who had sympathetic beneficiaries, sometimes the proverbial 
widows and orphans—or at least pension recipients—who, 
admittedly, had entrusted their funds to the wrong people. 
Should societal solicitousness extend that far? Perhaps the 
answer is yes given the extent to which the greater society 
suffered harms. Perhaps what tips this into Repugnant territory 
                                                                                                     
 51. SCHULL, supra note 46. 
 52. Heart Attack Grill, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heart_ 
Attack_Grill (last visited May 1, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); see also We’ll Make Reporting Easy for You . . . , HEART ATTACK 
GRILL, http://www.heartattackgrill.com/press.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Speaking of sexually 
provocative clothing, where in my categorization does Hooters belong? I would 
say that paternalism is not what is at issue (although many people with 
different world views would disagree, saying that people “should” be saved from 
pornography). There is an argument that it causes negative externalities insofar 
as the society, and especially many women, may suffer from the results of the 
message Hooters conveys. But of course all this turns on highly contested priors 
as to all these matters, something I readily acknowledge. 
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is the deliberate strategy to sell to investors who could be duped, 
even though the investors’ nominal sophistication meant that the 
law did not give them the protections they would have been 
accorded had they not qualified as sophisticated.53  
Other conflicts relate to disparities between people, mostly 
those involving income and wealth. What is the baseline standard 
of living to which all citizens are entitled? Should a lifesaving 
innovation only be available to the very wealthy? These conflicts 
reflect disagreements on first principles and on related empirical 
matters. The point warrants, and in the longer exposition of the 
argument will get, far more exposition, but for present purposes, 
consider different views as to why poor people are poor. If 
somebody thinks that a person is poor because of indolence, they 
are far less likely to think the person should be supplied with 
food, housing, and health care at government expense than 
someone who thinks people who are poor are unlucky or 
discriminated against and not responsible for their financial 
difficulties. (People’s prior beliefs as to whether government is 
good at addressing problems are also at issue—some people think 
government works far better than others do.) A final related clash 
of values concerns the responsibilities of citizenship. If there is a 
natural disaster or terrorist attack from which citizens need to 
escape, do private transportation companies and their employees 
have an obligation not to benefit from the increased demand for 
their services?  
The final category elicits what in my view is unwarranted 
outrage. My paradigmatic example is surge pricing, such as 
Uber’s surge pricing for cars on popular evenings. 
                                                                                                     
 53.  
In a December 28[, 2006] email discussing a list of customers to 
target for the year, Goldman’s Fabrice Tourre, then a vice president 
on the structured product correlation trading desk [who is now best 
known for his role in the Abacus transaction], said to ‘focus efforts’ on 
‘buy and hold rating-based buyers’ rather than ‘sophisticated hedge 
funds’ that ‘will be on the same side of the trade as we will.’ The 
‘same side of the trade’ as Goldman was the selling or shorting side—
those who expected the mortgage market to continue to decline. 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 235–
36 (2011). 
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The business models and practices in this category are, in my 
view, unobjectionable. But they elicit outrage for what I will 
characterize as self-serving reasons, often “shooting the 
messenger.” Somebody wants to go out on an evening on which 
there will be high demand for Uber cars, but low supply. Uber’s 
business model includes getting more drivers on the road by 
offering the drivers more money. People somehow feel an 
entitlement to the same price at all times (even though I expect 
they would be fine with a discounted price under certain 
circumstances—to take people to religious services, hospitals, or 
funerals?). Thus, the ride costing more at peak times is 
objectionable, and the messenger, the company that sets the 
higher price, is behaving outrageously. Status quo bias is a factor 
here, as it is with business models in this category more 
generally: the outrage arises when there is a change in what 
people had come to feel entitled to.  
A related example is when a company unbundles services 
that had previously been bundled. Someone used to getting a free 
meal on the plane, or checking luggage for free, now has to pay.54 
If asked why people who do not want the meal should have to pay 
for people who do, a person might respond, “This is just the 
airline’s way of raising prices.” In particular cases, it could be 
true (and might especially be believed by someone who thinks of 
business as trying to gouge its customers and generally take 
advantage whenever it can) but unbundling as a principle seems 
hard to argue with. 
Another example concerns outsourcing to countries with 
cheaper labor.55 A person who thinks the practice is odious is free 
                                                                                                     
 54. See Christopher Elliott, By Unbundling, Airlines Make a Bundle, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/04/01/AR2010040103315.html (last visited May 1, 2017) (discussing 
unbundling of services in the airline industry) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 55. See, e.g., Barbara Brotman, Chicago Activist Begins Oreo Boycott to 
Protest Mondelez Layoff Plans, CHI. TRIBUNE (Aug. 9, 2015), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/columnists/ct-oreos-brotman-talk-0810-
20150806-column.html (last visited May 1, 2017) (describing one woman’s 
mission to boycott Mondelez, the company who manufactures Oreo, for moving 
jobs to Mexico) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 
Daniel Roberts, Here’s Why Donald Trump is Giving Up Oreo Cookies, FORTUNE 
(Aug. 26, 2015, 6:37 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/08/26/donald-trump-oreos/ 
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to only purchase products made with higher-priced labor. A 
person who continues to purchase the cheap-labor products 
notwithstanding her objection to the practice has available a 
variety of narratives. Some seem to me principled—they “can’t 
afford” the higher prices, for example. But what of people who 
argue against the practice but continue to buy the products, 
arguing that companies should simply have lower profit margins 
or the executives should be paid less? I am not arguing that the 
present profit margins or executive compensation levels are 
somehow inviolate (although I suspect that even much lower 
executive compensation would not yield the cost savings at issue). 
The point, instead, is that the outrage reflects a fact about the 
world (and perhaps themselves) that is uncomfortable, and the 
outrage, I think, reflects an attempt to resolve the discomfort in a 
manner that may complicate the operation of markets. 
Another type of example can be introduced by describing a 
famous Kurt Vonnegut story published in 1961, Harrison 
Bergeron.56 The story begins: “The year was 2081, and everybody 
was finally equal. They weren’t only equal before God and the 
law. They were equal every which way. Nobody was smarter than 
anybody else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else. 
Nobody was stronger or quicker than anybody else.”57 A dance 
performance in this society is described as follows: “They weren’t 
really very good—no better than anybody else would have been, 
anyway. They were burdened with sashweights and bags of 
birdshot, and their faces were masked, so that no one, seeing a 
free and graceful gesture or a pretty face, would feel like 
something the cat drug in.”58  
The story conjures up a society in which equalization of 
talents, looks, and material resources was attempted on a grand 
scale.59 The subject is quite an uncomfortable one, and, in our 
                                                                                                     
(last visited May 1, 2017) (discussing Donald Trump’s boycott of Oreo cookies 
because manufacturer Mondelez was moving Chicago plant jobs to Mexico) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 56. Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY 
HOUSE 7 (1968). 
 57. Id. at 7. 
 58. Id. at 8. 
 59. See id. at 7–13 (depicting a world in which people’s superior attributes 
are equalized through handicaps). 
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world, the discomfort manifests itself in various contexts. For 
instance, a woman with various canonically desirable attributes 
(appearance, youth, intelligence) could sell her eggs for more than 
a woman with fewer of those attributes.60 (Getting into “hot 
nightspots” is also easier for people who are more attractive). One 
hears objections—that such people “should not” get these 
advantages over others. The same is true as to other desirable 
attributes that are, as all such attributes are, unevenly 
distributed. But people are often not consistent on this front. 
Nobody begrudges a beautiful movie star having many choices 
among highly desirable suitors. Society tolerates many 
inequalities, and—to get very provocative—some people who 
object to others’ advantages may feel quite entitled to their own.61 
Note that this category overlaps with the clash of values category 
insofar as it relates to advantages accruing to unevenly possessed 
attributes, and clearly, there is no bright line separating the two.  
I know people who very much disagree with many of the 
examples I will give. For instance, if a seller (say, Amazon) knows 
so much about you that they know precisely how much you are 
willing to pay for some good or service, is it problematic if they 
use that knowledge to get you to pay a bit more than the price 
they might charge someone else? Or is the relationship a game in 
which they have too many advantages, so that you should be able 
to frustrate their attempts to figure out your preferences enough 
to “exploit” you? And does it make a difference if there are 
mechanisms by which you can “conceal” your past purchases, and 
thus information about yourself, but do not do so? But, putting 
                                                                                                     
 60. See Jacoba Urist, How Much Should a Women be Paid for Her Eggs?, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/11/ 
how-much-should-a-woman-be-paid-for-her-eggs/414142/ (last visited May 1, 
2017) (noting higher prices paid for eggs from women with “desirable” traits) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 61. The concept of moral dumbfounding may be relevant here, at least by 
analogy. See generally JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND (2012) (providing 
background on moral dumbfounding). Moral dumbfounding is what happens 
when a person has a moral position that some behavior is wrong for a particular 
reason, but, when shown that the reason she gave is inapplicable, she still sticks 
to the position. Id. I suspect that a comparable phenomenon would occur if 
people were asked to give principled moral reasons in the contexts I describe 
here.  
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aside the specifics, the general category is one I hope will 
resonate. 
IV. How (and Why) Would the Mechanism(s) for Repugnant 
Business Models Work? 
In a sense, the concept of Repugnant Business Models is the 
easiest of the three. A search for “most hated man on Earth” 
would, for quite a few months, have yielded many hits for “Martin 
Shkreli.” But, even assuming, heroically, that I succeeded in 
establishing the concept of Repugnant Business Models and 
making it salient, how could doing so serve to reduce such 
models?  
The mechanisms I have described are mostly extra-legal, or 
involve the law in an attenuated or indirect way. One possibility I 
have mentioned for public companies is shareholder proposals to 
ask boards to consider putting in place steps to assure that their 
companies are not using Repugnant Business Models, and 
identifying what those steps are.62 Another is a disclosure 
requirement to the same end in public filings.63 Objections are 
easy to anticipate: more expense for companies but no 
substantive result, except perhaps in the case of disclosure 
requirements, a bad one, enriching plaintiffs’ lawyers who would 
find some supposed defect in the disclosure. The objection that a 
disclosure requirement would “inspire” costly opportunistic 
litigation by plaintiffs’ lawyers is one I take very seriously. The 
lawsuits brought by plaintiffs after corporations were required to 
make disclosures on pay in connection with the newly required 
say-on-pay vote were in my view opportunistic and of no benefit 
to companies or their shareholders.64 Either of two solutions are 
possible and should solve the problem: either companies would 
                                                                                                     
 62. Supra Part 0.  
 63. Supra Part 0. 
 64. See generally Kevin LaCroix, Enough Said Yet?: Say on Pay Litigation 
May Have Had Its Day, D&O DIARY (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/09/articles/executive-compensation/enough-
said-yet-say-on-pay-litigation-may-have-had-its-day/ (last visited May 1, 2017) 
(providing background on say on pay litigation) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
998 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973 (2017) 
have a “good faith” defense against private suits, such that if they 
could show that their disclosure was made in good faith after due 
inquiry, a suit would be dismissed, or, there would be no private 
cause of action. 
My main response, though, to the broader objection that my 
solution has no teeth is the following. Outrage-inducing scandals 
occur with some regularity. This by itself is leading to more calls 
for action. At the same time, companies’ concerns for their 
reputations are leading them to compete in the spheres of 
sustainability and corporate social responsibility.65 Compliance 
initiatives are increasingly focused not just on compliance with 
law but also with firms’ codes of ethics and conduct (which of 
course also reflect the firms’ reputational concerns). Moreover, 
regulators who have supervisory and monitoring responsibilities 
are well-positioned to make inquiries as to what steps are being 
taken to avoid and uncover Repugnant Business Models.  
In sum, given the outrage certain business models elicit, and 
the extent to which an appreciable amount of the outrage mirrors 
general concerns of law, the concept of Repugnant Business 
Models would seem well-situated to command attention in this 
general sphere. And not just perfunctory check-the-box attention. 
The inquiry will by its nature be nuanced, given that the category 
does not have necessary and sufficient conditions.  
V. Conclusion 
In their pursuit of profit, what should corporations refrain 
from doing? There are legal prohibitions, of course, but there are 
other pressures as well, including in the form of outrage. Some 
such pressures lead to the desired changes, and some do not, but 
even when they do not, they may very well influence what 
                                                                                                     
 65. See, e.g., DELOITTE, 2014 GLOBAL SURVEY ON REPUTATIONAL RISK: 
REPUTATION@RISK 17 (2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ 
global/Documents/Governance-Risk-Compliance/gx_grc_Reputation@Risk%20 
survey%20report_FINAL.pdf (discussing steps to be taken by companies to 
protect their reputations); Sustainability Reporting, AT&T, http://about. 
att.com/content/csr/home/sustainability-reporting.html (last visited May 1, 
2017) (outlining sustainability goals taken by AT&T) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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corporations do and do not do, and how they present themselves. 
Indeed, survey evidence suggests that corporations view 
reputational risk as one of the most significant risks they face.66 
While reputational risk may arise from bad outcomes of business 
models and conduct that would generally be considered 
non-objectionable, it can also arise from reactions to business 
models themselves. The use of child labor provides a ready 
example. 
To make my argument, I distinguish between three 
categories of business models: a) those that are repugnant and 
warrant pure outrage; b) those that cause complex, somewhat 
negative, reactions—conflicted outrage—for reasons relating to 
societal value conflicts on various subjects, including paternalism 
versus autonomy or the respective rights and obligations of 
people with greater, and fewer, resources; and c) finally, those 
that in my view elicit unwarranted outrage, where the outrage is 
often a case of “shooting the messenger,” trying to will away an 
inconvenient fact about the world. 
These three categories do not, of course, capture the universe 
of business models. Initially, I started by trying to define and 
make salient the concept of repugnant business models, and flesh 
out a definition that could be a basis for action, perhaps in the 
form of shareholder proposals requesting corporate boards to take 
steps to discourage such models, or disclosure requirements 
under which companies would describe the steps they are taking 
to avoid using such models. So far, so ambitious, but perhaps 
tractable, at least as a starting point. Consider in this regard the 
enormous negative reaction to the dramatic price rises in 
Daraprim and EpiPen, both of which are life-saving. The price 
rises were legal under present law, but were so unpopular that 
the companies to some extent retrenched, or competitors 
emerged. But the fix was not immediate: some damage was done. 
And what of behavior that is less extreme and hence less well 
publicized? 
Having considered “pure” outrage, I began thinking about 
outrage that seemed to me less pure—where what was at issue 
was controversial, and sometimes defended, even vigorously so. 
                                                                                                     
 66. See id. at 4 (presenting survey evidence of corporations’ concern for 
reputational risk). 
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Without, again, attempting to capture the universe of business 
models, I delineated two other categories, one of which involved 
activities and values about which people have principled but 
differing views, and the other of which involved clashes, but, dare 
I say it, less principled ones. Clearly, this judgment is extremely 
contestable, as are, more broadly, my three categories, and the 
criteria for inclusion therein. Indeed, some of what I am arguing 
for rests first on principles people have that they will not readily 
abandon (and this is not to say that they should.). 
This project seeks to persuade readers of three things. First, 
that developing a principled basis for characterizing what 
constitutes bad corporate behavior is a good idea. Second, that 
considering and debating the assumptions that would support or 
argue against my categories or criteria, or both, is also a good 
idea. Most importantly, I hope that this approach, and these 
categories, can be used to influence corporate behavior. If I 
succeed in making Repugnant Business Models salient, I can 
envision, among other sources of pressure and influence, 
shareholder proposals that ask companies to consider what they 
are doing to ensure that they do not have such models, or judges 
or regulators taking the characterization and the laxity of a 
company’s efforts in preventing such models into account in 
determining how they treat the company. Lawmakers, too, might 
be prodded to act. On the flip side, perhaps companies with 
business models that do not warrant outrage can put up a better 
defense when the models are attacked. I think a much better job 
can be done articulating a principled rationale for when outrage 
at corporate behavior is, and is not, warranted, saving outrage’s 
force for when it is most appropriate. I hope that I have made 
some contribution to the effort.   
